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Abstract 
 
Several questions about the minimum wage have not been answered 
adequately by scholars.  The wage’s origins, its reasons for federal passage, the 
roots of its decline, and its future prospects are all up for debate in the current 
literature.  This paper weighs in on these questions, hoping to improve the debate 
surrounding them.  In the process, the importance of linking the wage to 
citizenship becomes clear.  As the political thought of the issue has moved away 
from conceiving of minimum wages as tools for reaffirming the status of low 
wage workers, support for the wage, and its monetary value, has declined.  The 
need for a more responsible scholarship about the minimum wage, one without 
ideologically biased preconceptions, is also addressed.
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Introduction: Understanding the Minimum Wage 
Where did the idea of a minimum wage come from?  Why did the federal 
minimum wage get enacted when it did?  Why did the wage decline in political 
importance as well as real monetary value, starting in the 1970s?  What is the 
likely future of the minimum wage?  These basic questions about one of the oldest 
and most symbolic federal labor market policies have not been adequately 
answered by scholars.  This paper weighs in on these questions, hoping to 
improve the debate surrounding them.  In the process, the importance of linking 
the wage to citizenship becomes clear.  As the political thought of the issue has 
moved away from conceiving of minimum wages as tools for reaffirming the 
status of low wage workers, support for the wage, and its monetary value, has 
declined.   
Exploring these central questions about the wage illustrates that the 
political thought about the policy has had fused political and economic 
implications from the time of the wage’s conception during the late nineteenth 
century.  At the end of the nineteenth century, labor unions wanted to ensure that 
hourly wage workers would be considered citizens just as much as independent 
yeoman farmers had been.  Minimum wages provided reassurance that the 
economic status of a wage worker was tied to the political status of full 
participation in American society.  To unionists, the wage was about more than 
just preventing starvation or economic efficiency.   
As the decades have passed since the wage’s inception, various groups 
have advocated in favor of minimum wages.  Not all of these groups have been 
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equally enthusiastic advocates.  This paper attempts to show that as advocates 
have eroded their linkage of the wage to citizenship, their support of the wage has 
weakened.  While President Roosevelt and his New Deal tied the minimum wage 
to full political status and achieved substantial progress on wage legislation, the 
issue waned in importance as liberals linked the wage only to subsistence.  
Among the present advocates, the lack of a revival of the larger political 
dimensions of the wage most likely signals that a substantially higher wage floor 
will not be passed. 
 This paper also attempts to address the inadequate answers to the 
questions laid out above by defining a responsible approach to scholarship of the 
minimum wage.  This approach improves on the perspectives of not only many 
conservative scholars who take a narrow economic view of the policy, analyzing 
it only from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, but also many liberal 
academics who assume that the minimum wage is beneficial and ignores the 
potential drawbacks of the wage in their work.  These narrow approaches to the 
subject have prevented scholars from robustly evaluating the federal wage floor.  
In their analysis of minimum wages, economists need to look beyond 
disemployment effects, just as liberal scholars and community activists need to 
look beyond vague notions of justice.  This paper proposes a responsible 
scholarship of the wage that incorporates and balances considerations of political 
thought and economic efficiency. 
The minimum wage issue in particular is so interesting and instructive 
partly because the economics of the issue are so unclear.  Dozens of studies on the 
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issue over several decades have come up with contradictory findings again and 
again, with some economists each claiming the wage has negative, positive, or 
negligible effects (Nordlund 148).  Therefore, the economic literature has largely 
canceled itself out, leaving the issue as a judgment call for politicians.  Yet they 
cannot just ignore the issue as a meaningless policy.  The wage impacts millions 
of workers and employers.  Without an economic consensus to rely on, ideology 
becomes more important.  Political thought about government regulation, poverty, 
the value of work, and community have all heavily factored into the handling of 
the issue by political actors.  Examining how in fact historically and presently the 
Congress and the federal political system have processed the issue, with unusual 
array of political and economic forces, provides a nuanced understanding of trade 
offs, judgment, relative power of actors, priorities, and public policy making in 
the United States over the last century.   
The policy is relatively simple, so it and its consequences can be readily 
identified, studied, and evaluated.  The wage also has a long history, so it is 
possible to meaningfully compare and include numerous time periods, from the 
inception of the idea of a “living” wage with the late nineteenth century labor 
movement, to the present program administered by the federal Labor Department 
and advocated for by progressive activists. 
Thirty one states (as of January 1st, 2008), encompassing a large majority 
of the US population, have set their own minimum wages at rates above the 
federal level (Minimum Wage Laws).  As the inflation-adjusted value of the 
federal wage has eroded downward from its high point in 1968, more states have 
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decided to set their own policies.  Yet the focus in this paper is on the federal 
wage.  This project leaves task of analyzing state level developments to further 
research and assessment.  While it is true that an emphasis on national level 
policy may miss some significant details of wage policy, an analysis of state-by-
state developments would yield quite a long and unwieldy story.  A federal focus 
is appropriate because all of the major trends in political thought on this issue can 
be captured at the national level.  Federal policies are also ultimately the only 
ones capable of affecting the continental scale of the American economy.  
Moreover, since the 1930s the states have built off of national wage policy, and 
not vice versa. 
 A wide variety of sources have been consulted in order to build the 
arguments in this paper.  Three kinds of books are cited most frequently: works 
that analyze the economics and politics of the minimum wage, histories of the 
relevant time periods, and primary sources that advocate for or against wage or 
illustrate the political thought of an era.  Several journal articles in each of these 
categories have been helpful, as has the Department of Labor website.  Other 
miscellaneous sources include interviews with sources on Capitol Hill, newspaper 
articles, and court decisions.  Put together, this range of sources allows this paper 
to analyze the relationships between an array of intellectual, political, and 
economic factors that have shaped the minimum wage over the last 120 years.  
Besides the overarching claim about the erosion of the wage and its link to 
political status, this analysis has yielded the following conclusions, which are 
phrased as corrections to misperceptions in much of the existing literature. 
 5 
 First, chapter 1 explains that the minimum wage was conceived by 
organized labor, not by the Progressive Movement.  The progressives certainly 
played a vital role in advancing minimum wage legislation and intellectual 
justifications of the policy, but some scholars’ claims that progressives invented 
the wage floor concept are not borne out by fact.  Second, chapter 2 shows that 
the federal wage passed when it did only because of highly unusual factors, such 
as the Great Depression, the court packing attempt, and the innovations of New 
Deal political thought.  Passage of a national minimum wage was not part of an 
inevitable march toward higher living standards and economic security in 
America.  Third, chapter 3 claims that the wage declined in real value starting in 
the 1970s because of the combined effects of the halfhearted support of liberals, 
the decline of organized labor, the strengthening of conservatives in Congress and 
the presidency, and the emergent predominance of neoclassical economic 
thinking.  Finally, chapter 4 argues that the federal wage is not poised for 
comeback, despite the hopes of progressive activists of the contemporary living 
wage movement.  
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Chapter 1: Organized Labor, Progressives, and the Wage 
 
Scholars have regularly misattributed the beginnings of the minimum 
wage to the progressive movement.  To fully understand the political thought and 
interest groups connected to the wage, it should be pointed out that progressives 
did not invent the idea of a wage floor, organized labor did.  For example, Jerold 
Waltman of Baylor University, who specializes in the politics of the minimum 
wage, makes the mistake of placing the birth of the idea of a minimum wage with 
progressive reformers, leaving out labor’s contribution.  “The existence of a legal 
minimum wage in the United States is directly traceable to Progressivism…  It 
was Progressives who first laid the intellectual foundations necessary for a 
minimum wage to even secure a hearing” (Waltman 10).  Willis Nordlund, author 
of The Quest for a Living Wage, makes the same mistake, stating “Minimum 
wage programs did not have their origins in the United States” while ignoring the 
crucial role of unions in incubating the political thought behind such wage 
legislation.   
In contrast, scholar Lawrence Glickman is right to point out that the 
American minimum wage did not originate with the progressives.  As the 
following discussion makes clear, the historical record shows that the late 19th 
century labor unionists were earlier advocates of the idea. 
The term “living wage,” the predecessor of “minimum wage,” came into 
use after the 1877 railroad strike.  Glickman traces labor’s concern with wages to 
the emergent dominance of wage employment, which largely replaced artisan or 
cooperative employment among the working class after the Civil War.  At the 
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time, it was not clear if wage labor was consistent with individual freedom, 
democracy, justice, and citizenship.  A Jeffersonian political economy of self-
sufficient yeoman farmers had provided a framework for citizenship.  Wage-
earning factory workers, dependent upon owners for their livelihoods, were 
looked at as practically slaves.   
Yet as the century went on, workers redefined wage work to be acceptable 
in what Glickman calls a producerist interpretation, based on the value of 
production.  Through their labor, workers added value to a product.  Laborers 
should therefore be entitled to this added value.  In Glickman’s view, “while it 
rested to some degree on the idea that wages should enable a worker to live in 
modest comfort, fair wages discourse defined economic justice as a productive 
equivalence, a direct correspondence between the value of work performed and 
wages paid.  The formula generally called for ‘fair wages’ in exchange for a ‘fair 
day’s work.’ Fair wages in this view amounted to a fair price, that is, the full 
productive value of one’s labor” (Glickman 67).  Employers should pay fair 
wages that reflected the value that workers added to the product.     
A bit later in the century, labor took a fateful “consumerist” turn.  In this 
view, “Living wages” should be set at levels that meet the consumption needs of 
workers.  As Glickman defines it, this conception of the policy “is a wage level 
that offers workers the ability to support families to maintain self respect and to 
have both the means and the leisure to participate in the civic life of the nation” 
(66).  American Federation of Labor (AFL) President Samuel Gompers demanded 
wages commensurate with an “American Standard of Living” and that would 
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prevent breadwinners from becoming “non-consumers” (Glickman 78). Notice 
that in this conception of wages, there is no mention of the market price for labor 
or of the value of a worker’s added product.  Instead, pay would be determined 
based on the needs of a worker to maintain a family and participate in community.  
Wages demanded under this theoretical foundation were higher than under the 
producerist framework.  In fact, once needs-based demands came along, 
opponents of living wages often insisted that workers be paid according to the 
added value of their work, also known as their producerist value.  This 
consumerist needs-based rhetoric insisting on living wages was widely adopted by 
the labor movement by 1900.   
Consumerism had political consequences.  With a living wage, workers 
could feed their families and have enough left over to participate in the public 
sphere.  Labor’s conception of the living wage stood at the heart of a political 
economy of citizenship for the emerging society of wage earners.  High living 
wages were the foundation of citizenship because they provided the freedom and 
ability to participate in civic affairs.  “Workers produced goods and sold labor 
power.  With their free time and wages, they consumed, thereby becoming owners 
of labor and citizens.  In this web, consumption played a singularly important 
role, linking workers not only to production but also to public life” (Glickman 
103).  Consumption was a source of power, status, and citizenship for the working 
class. 
Yet this needs-based consumerist concept of wages did not totally replace 
the producerist idea of basing wages on the value of labor.  At the dawn of the last 
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century, the living wage and the minimum wage represented two competing 
conceptions of how to reward labor.  These ideas provided the intellectual 
foundation for later legislation and modes of thinking about wages during the 
twentieth century. 
Glickman’s identification of organized labor as the genesis of living wages 
has proven influential among scholars.  While the aforementioned misattributions 
by Waltman and Nordlund were written before Glickman published A Living 
Wage in 1997, many works published since then have given credit to the 
intellectual contributions of the labor movement.  Oren Levin-Waldman, for 
example, citing Glickman in The Case for the Minimum Wage: Competing Policy 
Models wrote in 2001 that “the minimum wage began as an attempt to achieve a 
living wage and build a consumer society” (7).  These ideas came from labor 
unionists. 
 Another contribution from the labor movement was theorizing the 
communal dignity of labor.  Unlike modern theorists of work, who emphasize the 
idea that people expect to be individually suited to their careers, industrial 
workers in repetitive and backbreaking jobs found dignity and satisfaction in the 
communal product of their labor (Muirhead 3).  Through labor, they collectively 
supported the community and advanced the nation.  Part of constructing a 
conception work with dignity and consistent with citizenship was demanding 
eight hour days, decent working conditions, and a living wage (Glickman 107).  
Around 1900, social reformers calling themselves “progressives” brought many of 
labor’s ideas into the mainstream of American politics. 
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 Indeed, scholars may have good reason for mistakenly claiming that 
progressives created the minimum wage.  Progressive writers often claimed to 
have invented the idea of a living wage (Glickman 131).  Furthermore, while the 
labor movement provided the intellectual foundation of the wage, they did not 
actively support minimum wage legislation before 1920.  Instead, they preferred 
to set wages through collective bargaining with employers.  The American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), the largest and most politically savvy trade union 
group of the period, did not have minimum wage on one of its first platforms in 
1898, or on its more comprehensive platform for its energetic launch into 
electoral politics during the election of 1906 (Greene 109).  Instead of the 
minimum wage, core labor issues (such as legislatively reversing judicial strike 
injunctions and maintaining workers’ right to collectively bargain) formed the 
nucleus of the AFL’s political agenda.  It should also be remembered that the 
AFL mostly represented decently paid workers in specific skilled crafts who often 
earned more than proposed minimum wages.   
Even the most radical factions in the labor movement representing the 
lowest paid workers, such as the International Workers of the World (IWW), did 
not endorse government set minimum wages.  This socialist labor confederation 
eschewed active participation in national electoral politics because many of its 
members (blacks, immigrants, and women) were disenfranchised and harbored a 
deep suspicion of government, which they saw as an elite-dominated tool of 
coercion rather than a social equalizer.  Instead of lobbying for legislation, IWW 
leaders were focused on ameliorating specific grievances in the workplace 
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through negotiation with employers.  The only engagement with the political 
system they wanted was to destroy it in a socialist revolution (Dubofsky 90).  
Even if the IWW, which had considerable clout during the 1910s, had chosen to 
endorse the wage, its radical alignment with socialists would have sharply limited 
its political effectiveness.  Despite its legislative inaction, organized labor 
nurtured the ideas of community, regulating employers, workers’ solidarity, and 
the link of full participation in American life with adequate wages.  All of these 
provided the intellectual context with which the Progressive Movement would 
ally with and borrow from to advance the cause of minimum wages. 
Just because progressives did not create the idea of the wage does not 
mean we should ignore or belittle their contributions to the wage’s history and 
political thought.  Their thinking about wages had several interlocking tenets.  
Like the labor movement, Progressives accepted the emerging industrial urban 
capitalist society, but they wanted to make it humane for all (Waltman 14).  
Progressivism was essentially a response to this new industrial economy, a 
reaction that aimed to reform, not to rebel, and to reconstruct, not to regress (Link 
51).      
The progressives were also heavily influenced by religion.  Mostly coming 
from mainline Protestant denominations, they worked to advanced Christian 
values in industrial relations and wage setting.  This social gospel gave a lasting 
moral justification to wage advocacy.  (Many religious organizations advocated 
for the minimum wage increase in 2007.)  Catholic theology of the time period 
also explicitly endorsed a living wage.  Father John Ryan, a priest, wrote A Living 
 12 
Wage, which famously spelled out a Catholic political economy that included 
living wages for all as a natural right from God (Ryan xii).   
One central aspect of the progressive Christian outlook was its concern 
with community.  They wanted reforms that would acknowledge concern for all 
social groups and elevate the public good.  A minimum wage was one such 
policy.  Progressive calls for an “American standard of living” appealed to the 
idea of a national community infused with moral standards (Waltman 15).  This 
rhetoric is similar to earlier demands of the labor movement, but the deep concern 
with Christian morality and community that underlies it made progressive thought 
distinct.  It also made these ideas distinctly persuasive during the first decades of 
the twentieth century.    
 Progressives justified intervention in the free functioning of the labor 
market with the belief that markets not unalterable natural creations.  God was 
natural and unalterable.  In contrast, markets were instruments that generally 
helped achieve efficiencies, but needed government intervention to make them 
function smoothly.  Labor had also rejected solely market-determined wages 
when unions demanded wages based on the needs of workers to consume at levels 
that would allow them to fully participate in their community rather than be wage 
slaves.  Progressive intellectuals also approved of unions because they raised 
wages and equalized employer-employee positions. 
Progressives even viewed the business closures caused by minimum wage 
laws as cleansing the market and society of inefficient enterprises (Waltman 16).  
It was felt that firms with business models based on exploiting workers with very 
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low wages should be forced to improve productivity or face bankruptcy.  In the 
absence of reliable empirical evidence about the extent of business closures 
caused by minimum wages, progressive scholars’ support for the wage is an early 
example of an irresponsible approach to the issue.  For the most part, they refused 
to balance their principled commitment to morality and community with the 
practical needs of firms.  These elements of the movement’s political thought may 
have tempted scholars to believe that the wage was a progressive creation.  
Yet the progressive’s ideology was never wholly committed to the 
minimum wage.  A whole branch of progressive political thought called for 
reform, rather than reconstruction by big government.  Called the New Freedom 
and lead by Woodrow Wilson, this strain of thought called for reforms that 
“envisaged the destruction of special privileges [and monopolies], restoration of 
the reign of competition, and reliance for future progress on individual enterprise.  
On social and economic Justice, Wilson was somewhat ambiguous” (Link 119).  
Not wanting to support government rearrangement of social and economic 
relationships or granting protection to special classes, he did not endorse the wage 
in the presidential campaign of 1912. 
The other main strain of progressive thought, called the New Nationalism 
and championed by Theodore Roosevelt, was more amenable to government 
wage setting. It emphasized new forms of muscular public regulation over trade 
and welfare-enhancing programs for vulnerable groups. Yet even some 
progressives in this strain did not support extending the wage to men (Waltman 
17).  The “Bull Moose” Progressive Party in 1912 endorsed minimum wages only 
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for women, for example (Link 110).  As a result of their partial ideological 
commitment, progressives proved to be uneven advocates for the policy.  It was 
never at the top of their agenda, unlike other issues such as trust-busting or 
corruption fighting. 
The Progressive movement also lacked organized labor’s emphasis on 
constructing a political economy of citizenship.  Instead of citizenship and 
working class solidarity, progressives focused on concerns of religious morality 
and community.  They wanted a “moral” or “social” political economy. 
Many progressives were from the middle class, and therefore they were 
not quite as willing as working class laborers to call for a living wage based on 
consuming at the level of an “American Standard of Living” rather than a 
minimum wage based on subsistence (Glickman 136).  It was fine to morally 
condemn starvation-level wages; higher living wages that ensured citizenship 
status were another thing.  Progressive reformers were split about which policy 
was superior; this ambiguity about the actual desirable levels of wages was 
reflected in their diction.  Many progressives used the term “living wage” as a 
synonym for “minimum [subsistence] wage” (Glickman 132).  As they pushed 
legislation, progressives may have also settled for minimum wages because they 
were simply lower and easier to write into law than living wages, although 
Glickman ignores this possibility.  As Waltman puts it “morality commanded a 
decent living for all; practicality made the minimum wage the most workable 
answer” (15).  After “living wage” was co-opted by the progressives and turned 
into a synonym for the minimum wage, the labor movement remained lost 
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enthusiasm for the term, although it kept the goal of a political economy based on 
relatively high working class wages.  “The term ‘living wage may have 
temporarily lost its place in labor rhetoric; yet the ideas and practices it 
represented and promoted became central to the discourse of the revived labor 
movement in the Depression decade. …the legacy of the living wage was central 
in the construction of the New Deal consumerist political economy” (Glickman 
132).   
Even if it tended accepted minimum wages over living wages, the 
progressive movement made great strides toward legislating into reality a more 
humane industrial society and a social political economy.  The movement was 
fully engaged in politics. It sponsored and enacted “the most far-reaching and 
significant economic and social legislation in American history before 1933” 
(124).  Reformers pushed the minimum wage through many state legislatures, 
with a young Felix Frankfurter leading the way to the nation’s first wage floor 
statute in Massachusetts in 1912.  After a few years of additional advocacy by 
progressive groups like the National Consumer’s League, more than a dozen other 
states had passed their own minimum wage laws.  On the national stage, 
Woodrow Wilson’s Democrats eventually gave in to the prodding of progressive 
activists when they outlawed child labor and added the minimum wage to the 
1916 campaign’s national party platform.  By the time the movement had run its 
course in 1920, even the Republican Party, urged on by its progressive wing, had 
officially endorsed the idea on its platform (Glickman 135).  Although 
progressives were not the wage’s author, they were its chief advocates.  
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Although subsumed for a time by progressive ambivalence, the idea that 
wages played a key role in working class citizenship would rise again.  In 
Congressional testimony in 1937, John L. Lewis, President of the Congress of 
Industrial Organization (CIO) [an unskilled labor union federation], stated that the 
FLSA “‘will bring a greater measure of leisure and economic well-being’; and 
‘the pending measure will offer to these unfortunate victims of our existing 
economic system and opportunity to rise to industrial citizenship’” (Nordlund 37).  
This echoes earlier ideas of the labor movement, ideas that gave birth to a 
commitment to minimum wages before the Progressive Era.  While the wage was 
never a top priority of labor unions, their thinking about its contribution to 
citizenship and a consumer economy has remained largely consistent throughout 
the decades. 
 
Doldrums of the 1920s 
The decade started off looking bright for reformers.  Although the 
progressive movement was waning, it was still scoring significant victories for 
wages in state legislatures.  By 1923, 14 states and the District of Columbia had 
enacted minimum wage laws.  That same year, however, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the District of Columbia’s minimum wage in Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital on the grounds that it violated the right of freedom of contract between 
employees and employers.  The wage therefore constituted an illegal forced 
payment from employer to laborer (Waltman 29).  This reasoning insulted the 
values of many labor activists and progressives who claimed that freedom of 
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contract was unobtainable in the presence of unequal power of employers over 
employees.  Even many middle class progressives agreed that it was impossible to 
separate questions of the value of work from issues of power in the industrial 
workplace.  For the rest of this relatively conservative decade, there were few 
developments concerning the minimum wage. 
 18 
Chapter 2: New Dealers and National Passage 
 After the long series of state level innovations, struggles, and setbacks, a 
federal minimum wage finally passed in 1938.  The Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) set a minimum hourly wage at $0.25, to be raised eventually to $0.40 in 
1945.  The amended FLSA and its minimum wage provisions are still in effect 
today.  The vast majority of employers and hourly workers are covered by the law 
(Nordlund 224).   
 The link of citizenship to minimum wages was made particularly clear 
during the Roosevelt Administration.  Inspired by the labor activists and 
progressive reformers before them, New Dealers made the link between the wage 
and citizenship explicit at times, and had this consumption based status of 
workers enacted into federal law. 
 Scholars have also not made clear that the passage of the minimum wage 
was based on unusual and fleeting circumstances.  The economic conditions of 
the Great Depression were highly distressful and demanded a response from 
policymakers.  Furthermore, the political thought of New Deal reformers was 
historically atypical and supported the minimum wage extremely well.  Instead of 
seeing FLSA passage as unusual, there is a tendency to perceive it as natural or 
inevitable, as part of an immutably rising standard of living for all Americans.  
This perception betrays a shallow understanding of the Depression period.  For 
the sake of understanding the minimum wage today, its place in history must be 
clarified. 
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 Many scholars, including Willis Norlund, author of The Quest For a 
Living Wage: The History of the Federal Minimum Wage Program, describes 
events surrounding the minimum wages in the United States in terms of an 
“evolution” from the Progressive Era to the present (Nordlund 1).  The term 
“evolution” implies a natural process with slow and steady progress.  In reality, 
the wage’s history has been marked by long periods of backsliding, with great 
advances occurring during short windows of reformers’ political dominance. 
 One of these windows was during the first two terms of President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s administration.  At this time, the government was grappling with the 
unusually harsh economic conditions of the Great Depression.  Sharp declines in 
average hourly wage rates and weekly hours worked illustrate the challenges 
policymakers had to deal with.  Hourly wages sank from $0.59 in 1929 to $0.49 in 
1933, while weekly hours worked also dropped during the same years from 48.3 
to 36.4.  Workers who had jobs considered themselves lucky.  Unemployment 
reached an unprecedented 25% in 1933, the climax of the Depression and the year 
of FDR’s 100 days.   
Moreover, when Roosevelt eventually sent a minimum wage bill to 
Congress in 1937, he urged its passage by stating without exaggeration that “‘one 
third of our population…is ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-housed’” (Waltman 32).  
Policymakers widely agreed that “something had to be done” to fight the 
Depression and were therefore unusually receptive to change (Norlund 7).  In A 
Commonwealth of Hope, Alan Lawson even goes so far as to call the New Deal 
“the most comprehensive moment of national reform in American history” 
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(Lawson 1).  To him, the distinctiveness of this moment stemmed from the rare 
depth of the period’s economic crisis.  Scholars who leave out the extraordinary 
nature of the circumstances surrounding the passage of the wage are omitting an 
essential explanatory feature of the wage’s birth. 
Under these distressing conditions, the first major step taken toward 
establishing minimum wages was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).  
This 1933 law required industry committees representing labor and management 
to draw up “codes of fair competition” that would set prices, production levels, 
minimum wages, and maximum hours for each industry.  In theory, these codes 
were supposed to stabilize the economy and halt the downward slide of wages.  
New Dealers believed that the “harmonious economy” or “cooperative 
commonwealth” created by NIRA and other measures would replace the cutthroat 
competition which had caused the growing inequality of wealth during the 1920s 
(Norlund 8).  In the view of FDR’s partisans, the Depression was precipitated by 
this “unbalanced economy,” composed of a small wealthy elite and the under-
consuming masses.   
Critics labeled the intra-industry cooperation of the NIRA “an American 
form of corporatism,” and indeed they were correct that the codes encouraged 
cartel-like behavior (Brinkley 12).  Yet the Act represented a breakthrough in 
national protective labor legislation.  “‘The NIRA can be credited with breaking 
down legal and political barriers to Federal action in the field of… wages and 
hours legislation, and other later achievements of the New Deal’” such as the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (Norlund 9).  Labor’s right to organize and bargain 
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collectively was also legally guaranteed for the first time in the NIRA.  Under the 
distressing circumstances of the Depression, laissez faire political thought had 
been decisively set aside, making way for the setting of minimum wages in the 
name of the common man.   
 The NIRA did not last long.  Administering the codes proved to be an 
unworkably complex task, producing confusion and irritation among business and 
labor interests.  When the Supreme Court declared the program unconstitutional 
in the 1935 decision Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S., few groups were unhappy to 
see it pass away (Brinkley 13).  A series of further court cases imperiled the entire 
New Deal shift toward government intervention in the economy, including 
minimum wage legislation.   
 The controlling precedent on minimum wage was 1923’s Supreme Court 
decision Adkins v. Children’s Hospital in which the majority struck down a 
District of Columbia law that fixed a wage floor for women.  Justice Sutherland 
was extremely disapproving of the wage, writing  
“‘the feature of this statute which, perhaps more than any other, puts 
upon it the stamp of invalidity is that it exacts from the employer an arbitrary 
payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no causal connection with his 
business, or the contract or the work the employee engages to do.’” Moreover “‘it 
ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a 
certain sum, not only whether the employee is capable of earning it, but 
irrespective of the ability of his business to sustain the burden…’” (Nordlund 
23). 
He continued 
““‘A statute requiring an employer to pay in money, to pay at prescribed 
and regular intervals, to pay the value of the services rendered, even to pay with 
fair relation to the extent of the benefit obtained from the service, would be 
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understandable.  But a statute which prescribes payment without regard to any of 
these things and solely with relation to circumstances apart from the contract of 
employment, the business affected by it and the work done under it, is so clearly 
the product of a naked, arbitrary exercise of power that it cannot be allowed to 
stand under the Constitution of the United States’” (23). 
These quotations are a clear expression of the freedom of contract and due 
process arguments that opponents of the wage used for decades.  They reflect a 
clearly limited conception of the government’s constitutional power to regulate 
business operations and economic activity.  In this view, federal authority over 
interstate commerce did not extend to wage setting.  Similar arguments carried the 
day in decisions such as Morehead v. Tipaldo (1936), which struck down state 
minimum wage measures (Nordlund 34). 
 Just a few months after Morehead v. Tipaldo, however, the court made a 
massive switch.  It upheld minimum wage laws as a “‘reasonable exercise of the 
police power of the State’” in 1937’s West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.  The 
opinion asked: 
 “What can be closer to the public interest than the health of women and 
their protection from unscrupulous and overreaching employers?  And if the 
protection of women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state power, how can it 
be said that the requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed is 
not an admissible means to that end?” (Nordlund 26) 
This turnaround by the court, from a harsh dismal of the wage to 
unapologetic acceptance, begs an explanation. 
Although noted progressive economist Henry Seager predicted during the 
1920s that a “‘gradual revival of progressive thinking’” would make the Court 
amenable to wage-setting, the evidence shows that the justices had not changed 
their rulings as part of some generational shift or steady evolution (Nordlund 25).  
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Instead, they were intimidated by the exceptional historical circumstances of the 
Great Depression, the dominance of FDR as President, and the supermajorities of 
Democrats in Congress after the 1936 landslide election.  It is tempting to see the 
Court’s remarkable judicial reversal as part of Seager’s rising progressivism or 
Nordlund’s “evolution” to a higher state of existence, but the truth is that highly 
circumstantial forces were at work. 
Although there is considerable controversy about why the justices 
switched sides, court watchers at the time “concluded that the justices had sensed 
political danger, if not from court packing then by some other means to curb their 
power and simply decided ‘a switch in time saves nine,’” despite claiming a more 
legalist justification for the switch based on the relative strength of precedent 
among the various similar cases (Lawson 177).  Much of the “political danger” 
for the Court stemmed from Roosevelt’s attempt to add new justices to the court 
with his court packing legislation.  Even though the plan never passed Congress, 
it had achieved the goal off making the judiciary more willing to accept New Deal 
policies.  Indeed, the overwhelming number of Democrats in the House (331 
Democrats) and the Senate (89 Democrats) made the court packing scheme more 
of a credible threat than it would have been during most other eras (Lawson 164).  
In the coming months, not only were minimum wages upheld, but so also were 
the protective labor clauses of the Wagner Act in the 1937 decision National 
Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co), which guaranteed 
collective bargaining rights once and for all.  Whatever the reason for the switch, 
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it was clearly not the result of some constant progression toward a regulated 
economy with higher living standards. 
Besides a judiciary under pressure, another contributing factor to the 
passage of the minimum wage during the 1930s was the political thought of the 
New Deal.  The ideas of this reform movement strongly supported the federal 
wage, perhaps more than any other movement discussed in this paper.  Two 
central tenets of New Deal thought were work and security.  On work, New 
Dealers felt that the government should ensure that every able American had 
access to a job which did not exploit them.  Avoiding exploitation and ensuring 
dignity meant minimum wages and collective bargaining (Brinkley 17).  Security 
meant that workers could rely on the government to correct the worst abuses of 
the free market.  This belief also supported wage floors, as well as social security 
and deposit insurance.  These ideas were more than responses to hard economic 
times; they were real ideological commitments to new ways for public laws and 
institutions to improve the lives of average citizens.  The New Dealers believed in 
an “obligation of the leaders government to work aggressively  and affirmatively 
to deal with the nation’s problems” and ideas that “embraced Keynesian 
economics and a vision of a sturdy welfare state” and “helped shape the next great 
experiments in liberal reform in the 1960s” (Brinkley 2,19). 
Discussing the political philosophy of the New Deal is problematic 
because the central leader of the movement, President Roosevelt, lacked a 
doctrinaire approach.  He often preferred pragmatic policy experimentation to 
theoretical purity.  Yet his administration brought to government a range of 
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progressive and liberal ideas that inspired numerous long lasting reforms.  On the 
campaign trail, FDR often emphasized his pragmatism, saying “I am a Christian 
and a democrat, that’s all” (Lawson 3).  Although Roosevelt’s ideas were often 
not crisply delineated (partly to leave himself room to maneuver) he was 
undeniably “a liberal reformer”, who advanced a vision of a cooperative polity 
with common ground for individualism and big government.  Roosevelt believed 
government could act as the guarantor of not only economic security, but also 
individual liberty (Lawson 2).  To New Dealers, the minimum wage was a 
regulatory policy that promoted individual independence through fairly 
compensated employment. 
A further attraction of fairly compensated employment was that it would 
prop up consumer purchasing power, a part of the economy that sorely needed 
help during the contractionary circumstances of the decade.  The more money that 
workers had in their pockets to spend, the more stable the economy would 
become, and as a result everyone would be better off.  New Dealers much 
preferred to raise the wages of workers rather than let the money be hoarded by 
the rich elite, who employed workers.  If these purchasing power arguments 
sound similar to earlier claims by labor unionists about the need for adequate 
consumption by workers, the New Deal version is comparable, except that it was 
brought into the political mainstream by Democrats and it particularly suited the 
unique economic context of the decade (Glickman 128). 
This powerful strain of thought is continues to be used by Democrats 
today.  In an interview for this paper, increasing aggregate consumption was cited 
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by a legislative aide to Senator Hilary Clinton as one of the reasons Mrs. Clinton 
supported the wage (Maughan 4/7/08). “[The minimum wage] provides a pay 
raise… to help pay for groceries, housing, energy costs and all of the other 
necessities of every day life” (Maughan).  Here, notice that support for the wage 
was couched in terms of supporting consumption.  While Hilary may not openly 
endorse a citizenship-minimum wage link, the roots of her ideas lay with New 
Dealers and labor unionists, who openly tied consumption to citizenship. 
Alongside purchasing power arguments, many New Deal Democrats also 
advocated for passage of the minimum wage with the same arguments used earlier 
by progressives: protecting the health and morals of workers and religious probity 
required a wage floor.  Yet as seen above these arguments are not what swayed 
the Supreme Court to finally accept a minimum wage.  As Levin-Waldman puts 
it, “More was needed than a moral argument for a minimum wage floor” (74).  
The extra ingredient that spurred the wage to passage and seemed to place it 
squarely in the public interest was the notion that the wage could shore up 
purchasing power.  The wage not only fit into the economic policy goals of 
depression fighting, but also fit with the stressed on work and security in the 
political philosophy of the New Deal. 
  Part of why New Deal thought was unique was the highly leftist influences 
on some members of FDR’s brain trust.  Columbia Professors Rexford Tugwell 
and Adolf Berle, two of the President’s top economic advisors, had become 
advocates of national economic planning while observing Soviet practices during 
the 1920s (Lawson 50).  Although their ambitious public planning schemes were 
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never implemented, the fact that these men influenced the economic orientation of 
the administration represents a clear high tide of communist influence in 
American politics.  Soviet-inspired presidential advisors would have been 
completely unacceptable after World War II.  It was during this brief moment of 
exceptional leftist sway, when policymakers were particularly amenable to 
attaching a political content to the wage, that the federal minimum wage was 
enacted. 
FDR went as far as to propose an economic bill of rights in his 1944 State 
of the Union address.  This so-called “second Bill of Rights” included education, 
health care, homeownership, and “the right to earn enough to provide adequate 
food and clothing and recreation” (Roosevelt 1).  This presidential endorsement in 
front of Congress of the living wage as integral to citizenship represented the high 
water mark of this idea’s acceptance in American politics.  These rights gave 
political meaning to economic conditions by explicitly tying together American 
citizenship and earning enough for adequate consumption and thereby full 
participation in civic life.  The fact that most of these economic rights were never 
adopted shows how stymied the New Deal was when viewed by its creators and 
how far America still is from the reformist vision of the cooperative 
commonwealth proposed by Roosevelt (Lawson 2).  The minimum wage is a 
piece of that commonwealth that did get passed, but only under unusual 
circumstances, and should be understood as vulnerable to attack by many of the 
same forces and that resisted the New Deal. 
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Although innovative, New Deal political thought was not revolutionary.  
In a time of rising fascism and communism, the New Deal was in fact relatively 
conservative because it preferred to preserve the capitalist system.  A young 
Hubert H. Humphrey excitedly wrote in his master’s thesis about the political 
philosophy of the Roosevelt Administration that “the New Deal, faced with an 
unprecedented economic collapse of the domestic and world economy, chose the 
course of moderation and rebuilding.  It acted boldly to stabilize and to rehabilitee 
the economic mechanism.  It religiously preserved the profit system, even at the 
price of vast subsidies and direct financial aid to millions of consumers” 
(Humphrey 6).  He went on to claim that “It seeks to preserve the capitalistic 
system, but the operations of that system are to be hedged in the interests of the 
security of the workingman, the farmer, and the small investor.  It has no desire to 
destroy individual liberty, but rather seeks to adjust personal freedom with the 
social good” (12).  The experimentation of the 1930s was innovative, but not 
radical.  As Brinkley describes it, “New Deal liberalism…sketched a vision of 
government that would compensate for rather than challenge the limitations of 
capitalism” (Brinkley 18).  By stemming the Depression and providing security to 
workers, the Roosevelt administration helped preserve capitalism and democracy 
in America.   
A final piece of evidence that supports the unusual circumstances of the 
minimum wage’s passage was the extremely controversial status of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act as it progressed through Congress.  Resistance to the New Deal at 
this time (1936-37) was building, and the FLSA would have had little chance of 
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passing if the number of congressional Democrats had been more in line with 
historical norms.  Indeed, John Forsythe’s “Legislative History of the FLSA” 
describes the minimum wage as the most controversial part of the most 
controversial bill in U.S. history up to that date.  The American Federation of 
Labor, usually a staunch supporter of worker protections, even expressed 
ambivalence about the law, due to its potential to usurp labor unions in their role 
as negotiators of workers’ wage increases (Forsythe 470).  All in all, 10 versions 
bill of the bill were introduced, with significant revisions in each draft (Forsythe 
474).  Even when Roosevelt called a special session on Congress in 1937 to 
consider the legislation, the FLSA was not passed.  There was nothing inevitable 
about the minimum wage’s passage at the federal level.  The substantial resistance 
to the FLSA reflected the wariness with wage and hour legislation after the failure 
of the NIRA and the growing political opposition to the New Deal (especially 
among Democrats from the South – a low wage region not pleased with the idea 
of Northern liberals imposing higher pay rates) during Roosevelt’s second term 
(Levin-Waldman 89).  When the FLSA did finally pass in 1938, the mandatory 
wage had been lowered to the harmless level of $0.25, down from the 
administration’s original proposal of $0.40.  Congress’s cooperative honeymoon 
with FDR during the Hundred Days of 1933 had long since passed.  The window 
for major domestic reforms was closing in 1937-38, and would shut completely a 
couple of years later when the nation’s attention turned to World War II.  
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Evaluating the New Deal: A Living Wage or a Minimum Wage?  
The growing, if not successful, web of minimum wage legislation of the 
1920s set the stage for concepts of a living wage and a minimum wage to make it 
into the mainstream of American national politics in the 1930s.  When the Great 
Depression brought concern with wages to the front of national politics, 
lawmakers faced a choice between adopting a living wage or a minimum wage.  
As detailed previously, living wages were conceived and favored by labor unions 
because they recognized workers’ as foundational to their citizenship and 
guaranteed a reasonable standard of living (Glickman 103).  Minimum wages, by 
contrast, had greater middle class support.  A minimum standard would prevent 
abject poverty while coming closer than a living wage to remunerating workers 
based on the value of their work.  When liberal forces gained dominance in the 
Congress and the White House during the Great Depression, they were finally in a 
position to enact federal legislation regulating wages.   
The legacies of the progressives and the labor movement offered policy 
makers a choice between either a living wage, focused on the consumption needs 
of the working class, or a minimum wage, determined based on the actual value of 
labor and ensuring subsistence.  Lawmakers incorporated elements of both into 
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the later Fair Labor Standards 
Act. By explicitly calling the new relatively low $0.25 wage floor a “minimum 
wage,” architects of the New Deal partially sided with setting wages based on the 
value of labor.  
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Yet proponents of the policy at the time also acknowledged that adequate 
levels of consumption by the working class should be a public policy goal, too.  
As discussed above, New Dealers argued that a minimum wage would support 
purchasing power.  This was a turning point for federal legislation.  
“Consumerism as [labor] activism was replaced by consumerism as public policy, 
shifting from a labor strategy to a strategy promoted by government and business” 
(Glickman 128).  The vision of a worker as a consumer and a citizen was enacted 
into law.  For decades, labor activists had dreamed of a consumerist economy 
where higher wages drove more consumption, which would drive more 
production in a cycle of economic advancement (Glickman 103).  This vision still 
largely reflects reality of the modern US economy.  Fully realizing a prosperous 
consumer economy composed of citizen-workers would have to wait for the 
prosperity engendered by World War II, but the consumerist ideas that were 
partially incorporated into the federal minimum wage legislation in the 1930s 
reflected a commitment to move towards that goal. 
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Chapter 3: The Wage in Decline 
As seen in the chart below, the minimum wage rose steadily in real value 
to nearly $10 in 1968.  After that, however, the wage went through long periods 
of stagnation, which translated into a declining inflation-adjusted value.  By mid-
2007, the wage had not been raised for nearly a decade and was at its lowest real 
value since 1950.  This erosion has taken place even as enhanced labor 
productivity should have been increasing wages.  A rollback clearly has occurred 
(Pollin et al. 12). 
 
(United States. History of Federal Minimum and Consumer Price Index) 
Scholars cannot agree on why the wage declined in relative monetary and 
political value during the 1970s and 1980s.  Some scholars place blame for the 
wage’s decline on the parallel decline of organized labor, while other writers 
blame liberals’ half-hearted commitment to the policy.  Still other scholars point 
to the rise of Reagan conservatives in Congress and the spreading popularity of 
their ideology.  Finally, the new intellectual dominance of neoclassical economic 
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thinking, which was largely accepted by conservatives and liberals, has been cited 
as a cause of the wage’s erosion.  The following discussion makes clear that all of 
these factors played a significant role in weakening the wage; none of them 
should be ignored.  Furthermore, these factors combined to largely disassociate 
the wage from citizenship.  By emptying the policy of its political content, the 
wage has become more of an economic statistic than an ideological commitment 
to fully including low wage workers in the public life of the nation.  
Analyzing the typical legislative struggle surrounding post-1945 minimum 
wage increases shows how each factor (the decline of labor, the weak 
commitment of liberals, the rise of conservatism, and the ascendance of 
neoclassical economic thought) has contributed to the decline of the wage.  
Legislation to raise the wage floor is usually initiated by labor organizations and 
staunchly liberal Democratic allies in the Congress.  Yet when labor has made the 
wage a priority, fewer and fewer policymakers have cared as the percentage of 
unionized workers and the resources of labor PACs have steadily withered over 
the last 50 years (Levin-Waldman 158).  While unions’ supportive stance has 
remained unchanged, their voice has diminished.  This is particularly important 
because, as this section will show, labor was one of the only groups after during 
the last few decades with a strong ideological commitment to the wage, a 
perspective that linked adequate wages to the full status of workers in society. 
Levin-Waldman irresponsibly and with a clear liberal bias blames the 
decline of unions (and the minimum wage) on a management-government anti-
unionization conspiracy spearheaded by Reaganites, while ignoring workforce 
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changes, and a lack of energy in the trade union movement (Levin Waldman 9).  
This is an example of the liberal shallowness that a responsible scholarship of the 
wage should aspire to overcome. 
As union influence has faded, liberals have had to play an increasingly 
important role in supporting the minimum wage.  Senator Edward Kennedy, a 
leading liberal, has been a vocal advocate for every minimum wage increase since 
the Ford Administration.  Yet the wage has had only a peripheral place in liberal 
political thought, contributing to the policy’s weakness.  Many liberals have been 
more concerned about issues of identity politics or the rights revolution than wage 
policy.   
A new group of activists with a distinct vision of American political 
economy emerged out of the New Deal and reached the peak of power during the 
1960s.  These social welfare liberals have been the main advocates of the 
minimum wage since the Second World War until the present.  Although other 
groups, such as organized labor and modern progressives, have also supported 
wage legislation, social welfare liberalism has been the most influential force for 
decades.  The political thought of these liberals dropped the prior emphases on 
religion and consumerist citizenship.  The argument that the minimum wage 
should add to purchasing power was rarely made by these liberals.  “Initially 
[during the 1930s] it was believed that the minimum wage would be of concern to 
all because it would affect the stability of the entire labor market.  Today, it is 
believed that the current minimum-wage labor market has little connection to the 
overall market” (Levin-Waldman 8).  These liberals were far more concerned 
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with reducing poverty and economic inequality than they were with a larger 
conception of citizenship.  As a result, several scholars including Waltman blame 
liberals for the wage’s decline.  “Social welfare liberals view the minimum wage 
as a cash transfer program, and not a very important one at that” (Waltman 23).  
The minimum wage was no longer thought of as a demand stimulation (full 
employment) policy that provides workers a full place in American life, but rather 
as a welfare policy. 
Along with focusing on poverty, many liberals, in their pursuit of rights 
for particular groups (African Americans, homosexuals, criminal suspects, the 
disabled) deemphasized the idea of the collective and the communal.  Franklin 
Roosevelt’s vision of a cooperative commonwealth was sidelined (Graham 314).  
Group identity rather than collective identity became the focus. 
As historian Otis Graham describes it, “The ‘L-word’ now seemed the 
third rail of American politics, synonymous, in Reagan and Bush rhetoric, with 
ACLU softness on crime, suspicion of the military, ‘tax and spend’ economics, 
indifference to the values of family and flag” (Graham 311).  Liberalism became 
publicly defined in cultural, rather than economic, terms.  As a result, the 
Democratic Party’s base has been eroded not only by the shriveling of organized 
labor but also by the departure of Southerners and Catholics alienated by liberal 
excess (Graham 311).  Many liberals with had only lukewarm enthusiasm for the 
wage, a policy that seemed peripheral to their central cultural agenda of 
expanding civil rights. 
 36 
Advocates of the wage had to wait until the 1980s for studies to be 
published showing that the decline of the wage contributed to widening income 
inequality (Levin-Waldman 7).  Liberals, who list inequality as a growing 
concern, should perhaps bring the wage closer to the core of their agenda.  When 
viewed as a universal social policy (indeed some labor influenced advocates 
would call it the glue in our social compact), rather than just an anti-poverty 
policy, the wage would appear more important to liberal Democrats. 
 As labor has withered and liberals have shifted their focus away from 
building the cooperative commonwealth, conservative forces have remained 
potent and even strengthened in some ways.  President Reagan helped bolster 
conservatives’ numbers in Congress and served as a bulwark against the 
minimum wage.  On the campaign trail, he declared “‘The minimum wage has 
caused more misery and unemployment than anything since the Great 
Depression.’”  Acknowledging no citizenship implications in the wage, Reagan 
instead viewed it as a inefficient economic policy, saying “‘a lot of our ills are due 
to the minimum wage…[and therefore] the very least we should do is…have a 
lower minimum wage today for young people who are entering the job market for 
the first time’” (Norlund 189). During his eight years in the White House, Reagan 
refused to sign an increase.  President George W. Bush took a similarly anti-wage 
stance, although he was forced to go along with an increase in 2007 in the wake 
of losing control of Congress and dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq. 
Employer associations have remained a potent conservative advocacy 
group working against the wage.  The business community’s most powerful 
 37 
political advocacy organizations include the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the National 
Federation of Independent Business.  These groups have lead the fight in 
Washington against the minimum wage for decades, arguing that the policy 
causes employment losses, business relocations, and an unacceptable restriction 
on the freedom of firms.  Employer associations have proven quite effective.  For 
example, when unions funded the Economic Policy Institute, a left-leaning 
Washington think tank, the restaurant industry sponsored the creation of the 
Employment Policies Institute to perform research and advocacy against 
minimum and living wages (Fox 4).  Every minimum wage increase must 
overcome the opposition of these conservative employer groups. 
Outside of Congress, neoclassical economic thought, emphasizing 
deregulation, gained dominance among economists during the 1970s and 1980s.  
This development also worked against the wage.  Neoclassical economists viewed 
the wage as an inefficient interference with the market, and produced studies 
showing the negative impacts of the wage on employment and prices.  During this 
“Decade of Empiricism,” the shift away from institutional economics, which 
emphasized the cultural and unequal power relations that help determine wages, 
and instead toward a more free market approach began to influence policymakers 
(Norlund 143). 
Acceptance of neoclassical economic thought, with its emphasis on 
efficiency and research purporting to show that minimum wages cause layoffs, 
became so widespread that even the New York Times began to editorialize 
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against the minimum wage during the 1970s and 1980s, writing that a high 
minimum wage “‘offers no remedy’” and that “‘employers would respond to the 
higher minimum by curtailing production and switching to labor-saving 
machinery’” (McKenzie 52).  One Times editorial from 1987 was even entitled 
“The Right Minimum Wage: $0.00” and argued that “‘there’s a virtual consensus 
among economists that the minimum wage is an idea whose time has passed.  
Raising the…wage by a substantial amount would price working poor people out 
of the job market’” (McKenzie 122).  Liberals have been willing to adopt this 
language of economic efficiency and advocate for minimally inefficient well-
targeted social policies like the Earned Income Tax Credit.  Therefore, the 
minimum wage, which is relatively poorly targeted and inefficient (18.2% of 
minimum wage workers had family incomes above $80,000 in 2005), has 
appeared less attractive (Mayer 18).  Yet by accepting the criteria of economic 
efficiency to evaluate policies, liberals are implicitly devaluing the more symbolic 
role of the minimum wage as a guarantor of an American standard of living and 
full citizenship to the lowest paid workers. 
With liberals conservatives, and prominent economists all sidelining the 
link to full status via adequate consumption, the minimum wage has lost a potent 
justification.  Moreover, the combined effects of declining unionism, 
unenthusiastic liberals, strengthened conservatives, and anti-regulation 
economists has weakened the minimum wage.  As a result, the minimum wage 
has had a low political importance and monetary value during the present decade. 
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Chapter 4: Contemporary Battles and Future Stagnation 
 
In the wake of the most recent increase in the minimum wage passed 
Congress in 2007, there is no consensus among scholars about where the wage is 
headed from in the future. Many scholars have not had time to evaluate the latest 
round of legislation or have ventured to make predictions about upcoming events.  
Yet the few who have are split.  Some see a bright future, especially for the living 
wage movement, while others have only ominous predictions for the wage policy.  
Unfortunately for low wage workers, a wide reconnaissance and synthesis of the 
present scholarship reveals that little progress is likely anytime soon. 
As shown throughout this paper, labor unions have historically been a key 
constituency in support of wage-bolstering policies, but cannot be relied upon in 
the future to substantially advance minimum wage legislation.  Union 
membership and political clout is in decline, and they view the wage as a 
peripheral issue, although to a lesser extent than liberals (Levin Waldman 141).  
When unions have had a choice to commit to throw their political resources 
behind core labor issues (such as laws affecting organizing drives or strike 
practices) or to push for minimum wage increases, core issues have taken priority 
(Nordlund 73).  That is not to say unions are withering into irrelevancy.  Over the 
last decade, a growing service sector with many low wage workers has given 
newfound clout to some organizations like the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU), which includes janitors, home healthcare aides, and child care 
providers.  These low-wage occupations are likely to remain significant parts of 
the economy for years to come. The minimum wage will be particularly relevant 
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to these workers and their political representatives.  The SEIU, for example, made 
last year’s wage increase one of its three top issues (Service Employees) and was 
the source of Senator Hilary Clinton’s proposal to index the wage to 
Congressional pay increases (Maughan 4/7/08).  On the whole, however, the 
heyday of organized labor’s ability to influence the political system has passed. 
Waltman prescribes that through embracing “civic republicanism,” a new 
progressive path is possible.  A key part of this path involves turning politics 
toward a political economy of citizenship, one that will put more focus on the 
minimum wage and its inadequacies.  Like earlier consumerist ideas, the thinking 
here is that workers are unable to act like full citizens if they are not paid a living 
wage (Waltman 25).  Some progressives may have already made this turn toward 
inclusive political economy.  Their attention to raising the minimum wage to the 
level of a living wage via the living wage movement indicates their concern with 
more than just poverty but also with equity throughout the economic and political 
systems. 
The time may be right for these progressives to make substantial headway.  
If the 2006 election was any indication, a new Democratic presidential 
administration is likely to come to Washington in 2008.  The electorate is not only 
leaning farther to left, it is also hungry for action on domestic issues.  As David 
Brooks commented in a recent New York Times column, voters are in a “post war 
mentality”, meaning that they are less concerned with national security than 
earlier in the decade and more concerned with socially-oriented problems like 
health care and housing (Brooks A17).  In Brooks’s view the shift in outlook 
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includes a shift in values, from toughness to cooperation.  The spirit of this 
dawning period may carry forward progressive legislation addressing issues of 
economic inequality, labor, and wages.  It remains to be seen if modern 
progressives are willing to go further than their liberal predecessors toward 
acknowledging the links between democratic citizenship and wages in their 
legislation, but some commentators think it is certainly possible. 
Levin-Waldman suggests that a real commitment to the least paid workers 
and achieving a living wage means that labor market policy should move beyond 
the minimum wage.  He suggests a true living wage, somewhere above $10 an 
hour, to ensure that workers earn incomes above the poverty line and can support 
a family, and mandated employer training to bring workers’ skill levels in line 
with the higher mandated pay.  He also suggest that a return to the New Deal 
policy of the government as the “employer of last resort” (paying a living wage) 
will tighten the job market and thereby raise wages.  Levin-Waldman 
acknowledges that his calls for a comprehensive employment program are ill-
suited to the current political climate suspicious of expansions in government 
intervention in the economy.  He therefore calls for a shift in priorities and 
political thought to a stance that demands real gains for low-income workers 
(187).  He does not address whether or not this is a realistic proposal. 
Levin-Waltman also suggests that the current political dichotomy of the 
minimum wage debate is portrayed as a choice between youth disemployment and 
poverty alleviation.  The debate avoids the question of whether the minimum 
wage is the best method to achieve a true living wage.  Indeed, he suggests that it 
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is not.  Not only is the minimum wage policy flawed, he also claims the political 
thought of the issue is, too.  He treats the political rhetoric with along the 
economic policy.  To him, changing one is the key to advancing the other.  
Despite the hopes of some commentators, there is just no communitarian 
basis in today’s mainstream political thought to support a substantially higher 
minimum wage—a living wage—on the national level.  Senator Obama stresses 
community more than other candidates, indeed he has a past as a community 
organizer in low wage urban areas.  He goes farther than Senator Clinton by 
proposing indexing the wage to inflation (“Economy”).  Obama is the best hope 
this year for moving toward a living wage.  
Beyond this year, the living wage movement provides another source of 
possibility for higher wage levels.  Sklar et al. prescribes community action and 
organizing to pass living wage ordinances (72).  To Sklar, such activity can fulfill 
the hopes of a sustained ideological commitment to economic justice that many 
progressives profess (4).  
The current reemergence of living wage campaigns in municipalities 
across the country demonstrates the enduring influence of the labor movement’s 
original rhetoric and ideas (wages based on needs rather than value of work) 
surrounding work, as well as a turn farther away from market-based thinking 
(Sklar et al. 89).   These campaigns have had striking success, achieving passage 
of over 80 living wage ordinances between 1994 and 2003 (Levi, et al.). The 
highest local wage is $9.50 in Santa Fe, New Mexico.  Advocates of these 
policies are often progressive activists that have substantially different views from 
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social welfare liberals on wage issues.  Modern progressives, like the progressive 
movement a century before them, value community and are unwilling to 
countenance some members of their communities earning subsistence level wages 
or worse.  Indeed, living wage campaigns are often rooted in civil society 
networks of specific neighborhoods, usually consisting of coalitions between 
locally rooted labor unions, religious institutions, and community organizations 
(Levi et al. 7).  
Robert Pollin, an active economist-activist author, also argues for a federal 
living wage, and provides a practical way to achieve it (via indexation coupled 
with carrying out studies that show that jobs are not destroyed by the increases) 
(107).  Yet even this advocate, who firmly places himself in policy terms within 
the contemporary living wage movement, shows a limited commitment to the 
ambitious political ideas associated with a living wage since its beginnings with 
organized labor.  For example, although Pollin even cites Glickman’s conception 
of the living wage being “‘at a level that offers workers the ability to support 
families to maintain self respect and to have both the means and the leisure to 
participate in the civic life of the nation’” (104). Pollin leaves these 
communitarian goals behind for the rest of his paper, never fleshing them out, and 
goes on to only justify his objective of living wage in the negative terms of a lack 
of disemployment and inflationary effects, instead of the positive terms of 
enabling citizenship, democracy, and community solidarity.   
Pollin, whose policies go much farther than the current Democratic 
Congress, thinks like a social welfare liberal, elevating economic efficiency above 
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justice or solidarity, and concluding that “Nobody would want to raise the 
minimum wage mandate to a level that would discourage employment.  The most 
effective strategy would be to push the minimum wage just to the point before it 
does begin to discourage hiring” (106).  President Roosevelt, in contrast, was 
willing to countenance layoffs to achieve gains in the political and economic 
status of workers with a legal right to a living wage.  With advocates like Pollin, 
the contemporary political thought of the wage issue will probably not get us to a 
living wage in the foreseeable future. 
As discussed in earlier sections, while groups like liberals and organized 
labor have declined, the opposition has remained at least constant.  For example, 
even when multi-billion dollar small business tax cuts were added to the Fair 
Minimum Wage Act of 2007, which will raise the real minimum wage only 4% 
over its recent peak level in1997, three Republican Senators still voted against the 
bill (“Senate Roll Call Votes” and Pollin et al.12).  These Senate holdouts desire 
an outright repeal of the wage 70 years after its initial passage.  There are many 
more such stalwarts in the House. 
In his statement supporting passage of the combined minimum wage – 
small business tax cut bill, President Bush made no mention of the ideas of 
justice, community solidarity, purchasing power, or poverty.  Instead, he praised 
the bill for “helping maintain a strong and dynamic labor market and promoting 
continued economic growth” (“President”).  By emphasizing dynamism, he may 
have even been supporting keep the wage low.  Clearly, conservatives aligned 
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with the President are not giving up much ground to the wage, politically or 
ideologically.  
Today in Washington, conservatism has been weakened but not 
discredited.  Its ideology and its political actors will remain potent forces.  While 
Mitt Romney and Ron Paul represented respectively the business and libertarian 
wings of the Republican Party, their combined popularity in 2007 shows that 
political thought hostile to the wage still has broad appeal.  (Ron Paul has been 
trying to repeal the wage since 1983 (Nordlund 182)).    
In Congress and around the nation, liberals are still the core constituency 
and activist group of the Democratic Party.  Chairman Charles Rangel and 
Chairman Ted Kennedy, for example, were not only the central figures in 
Congressional passage of the 2007 increase, but also leading Washington liberals.  
They have continued their relatively weak ideological commitment to the wage 
and have not moved it to be a more central part of their political vision for the 
country, although admittedly it is a part of their agenda, albeit mostly a symbolic 
one. 
Centrist Democrats in the mold of Bill Clinton also have mustered only a 
weak endorsement of the wage.   Their economic thought has favored public 
investment as a tool “to upgrade the economic vigor of the nation as a whole” and 
to enhance America’s international economic competitiveness (Rosenof 169).  
Although President Clinton supported an increase of the minimum in 1996, saying 
“‘it’s hard to raise a family on $4.25 an hour.  We must make sure that the 
minimum wage is a living wage’”, neither wages nor the idea of a strong social 
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compact ended up being the guiding concerns of his policies (Nordlund 207).  The 
revised Clintonian liberalism of the 1990s failed to elevate the lowly status of 
wage policy on the political agenda. 
Liberals first went through genuine introspection during the 1990s 
(Graham 315) and this proceeded “haltingly” according to Graham.  Al Gore’s 
toned down liberalism showed no signs of substantial energy or rejuvenation.  
That may be changing in 2008 with the invigorating Presidential race and 
spreading living wage campaign, but “liberal” remains a stigmatized term. 
Overall, it is unrealistic to be optimistic about the future of the issue.  The 
most recent increase barely makes up for inflation, while still giving businesses a 
multi-billion dollar tax break.  Substantial progress would require much greater 
trade offs than Democratic leaders –all liberals—will probably be willing to make 
for this mostly symbolic issue (Waltman 23). They were not willing to 
compromise with the Republicans on approving Reagan’s judicial nominees in 
1988 or the repealing the estate tax in 2006 to get a minimum wage increase 
(Nordlund 185 and Hulse 1).  Raising the wage is just not that important. 
Historian Otis Graham, a fan of liberal self-criticism, comments that 
“Whatever is ahead, at the start of the twenty-first century the liberal narrative is 
fragmented into confusion, the connections to the mainstream public lost, along 
with a convincing vision of what the historical moment [post 9/11] requires” 
(Graham 317).  Here, fragmented is the key word.  Some segments are energetic 
and expanding such as the SEIU, living wage campaigns, the Latino working 
class, and progressive bloggers, while many traditional Democratic constituencies 
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are stagnant or declining.  Certainly, a decisive shift toward communal thinking 
among the whole American left is not evident.  In the absence of such a shift 
toward concern for low-wage workers as part of the American whole and not just 
an unfortunate underclass, there is little hope for a recovery of the wage in value 
and political importance.   
Without a solid ideological commitment to the wage among leading 
liberals, Nordlund claims the policy is particularly vulnerable because, as 
mentioned previously, it also has not demonstrated clear empirical benefits.  This 
lack of concrete results has ominous consequences for the wage’s future.  
Nordlund predicts that “If supporters cannot devise methods to unequivocally 
demonstrate the benefits and advantages of the program, it may at some point be 
the target for less sympathetic legislators” (xvii).  
While the balance of forces does not herald a breakthrough toward living 
wages, perceptive observers of politics should not forget that a sea change the 
economic or political context, like another Depression, could occur.  Just as the 
New Deal did, a political response to a political or economic shock could very 
well push the wage high up on the political agenda once again.  
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Conclusion: Findings, Ambiguity, and Responsibility 
 
The lack of consensus about the minimum wage is striking and has 
practical consequences.  From the earliest debates about the issue just after the 
turn of the century to studies with exactly opposite conclusions in 2007, there has 
been research out there to that supports almost every viewpoint on the issue.  
Indeed, the economics debate is so clouded with a lack of consensus that it covers 
up underlying political issues that are at play, such as citizenship and the role of 
government in the economy (Levin Waldman xii). 
Economic research first substantially took aim at the minimum wage in 
the 1940s with research published by Joseph Stigler.  During the following 
decades numerous congressional reports and academic studies, based on various 
theories of how the labor market functions, have managed to provide backing 
every major ideological viewpoint on the wage (Card and Kreuger 370).  For 
every perspective, there is a study to support it and a counter-study to refute it.  
While new findings continue to be published almost yearly, no new major 
economic theories about the wage have emerged (Card and Kreuger 13).   For the 
interested reader, the best summaries of empirical findings on the minimum wage 
are found in Chapter 7 of Norlund’s “The Quest for the Living Wage” (148) and 
throughout Fox’s paper “Minimum Wage Trends: Understanding Past and 
Contemporary Research” published by the labor-allied Economic Policy Institute.  
In this scenario of static theory and countervailing research, professional 
economists have had little impact on the fate of the wage (Levin-Waldman 34).  
“The status of the minimum wage is contingent on the political landscape and 
 49 
may have absolutely nothing to do with the predictive outcomes arising from 
economic models” (Levin-Waldman 2).  Here, Levin-Waldman decisively takes 
the side of politics driving policy, claiming that one cannot understand the issue 
without understanding the political process around it.  Therefore, the center of 
gravity in the debate is with relevant interest groups and senior members of 
Congress, who have a checkered record as supporters of the minimum wage. 
The dubious standing of commonly held beliefs about the ill-effects of the 
minimum wage also casts doubt on common knowledge about other economic 
policy issues.  Tax policy comes immediately to mind, where often-heard 
conservative claims about the recessionary consequences of tax increases may be 
more of a theory than a reality.  Studies show that federal income tax decreases 
have little correlation with economic growth (“Tax Cuts” 4).  When a consensus 
does not exist about an issue, it seems that the presence of any professional 
academic research on a policy topic is enough of a basis for political actors to 
advance a claim.  When often ideologically-motivated claims are empirically 
controversial yet advanced anyway, the result is corrosive for the political system.  
The public does not know who to trust and misguided policy is created.  To avoid 
such corrosion, political actors should raise the bar of professional agreement 
about research they cite, not only on the minimum wage, but also on other issues. 
Overall, this paper has taken sides on a number of questions about the 
history of the wage, finding that that the minimum wage was conceived by 
organized labor, not by the Progressive Movement.  The progressives certainly 
played a vital role in advancing legislation and intellectual justifications of the 
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policy, but some scholars’ claims that progressives invented the wage floor 
concept miss the earlier contributions of organized labor, including the key 
linking of minimum wages to participation in civic life. During the 1930s, the 
economic context of declining wages became paramount, overwhelming most 
other concerns of policymakers about setting wage levels.  This economic context 
combined with the political dominance of Roosevelt’s New Deal to produce the 
right conditions for the passage of the federal minimum wage.  
In contrast, the decline of the wage in the 1980s was the product of a 
combination of political forces, including the strengthening of the conservatives 
in Congress, the decline of unions, the weak place for the wage in liberal political 
thought, and the renewed faith in neoclassical economic models (which was an 
intellectual development rather than a change in the state of the economy or an 
electoral event).  When this view of historical forces is applied to the present, 
there are no large shifts apparent in economic pre-conditions, political forces, 
ideology, or institutions that would propel major changes.  Unfortunately for low 
wage workers in need, the outlook for the wage looks stable, albeit in a reduced 
state relative to the liberal heyday of the 1960s.  
 This paper has not addressed a prescient question, raised particularly by 
Willis Nordlund in his history of the implementation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act: “Is the federal minimum wage program the appropriate device for ensuring a 
living wage to the nation’s lowest wage earners?” (xvii).  Without fully answering 
this question, Nordlund at least makes clear that the wage has not lived up to its 
supporters’ expectations of being an antidote for social ills or the catastrophic 
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toxin for business predicted by its opponents.  As this paper makes clear, the 
minimum wage floor does have considerable practical and symbolic importance, 
but more effective alternatives should not be ruled out. 
 A fair analysis of the wage and its potential alternatives is a necessary 
prerequisite to improving policy.  Unfortunately, many scholars’ works are 
skewed toward certain ideologies.  A few examples of this biased scholarship 
were pointed out in this paper.  Chapter 1’s description of how progressive 
activists demanded minimum wages without empirical evidence of their affects, 
and chapter 3’s account liberal of scholars that see conspiracies against labor 
rather than internal weakness illustrate some of typical shortcomings in work 
about the wage.  Liberals take certain assumptions for granted, such as the 
harmlessness of minimum wages.  In reality, some business owners look at their 
balance sheets and probably find minimum wage increases to be unaffordable.  
In-depth conservative critiques about the ramifications of minimum wages for 
liberty, for example, are absent here and in the scholarship.  More conservative 
voices are needed, voices that do not just assume that the wage is evil, but rather 
carefully consider the economic and political ramifications of government wage 
setting.  With these improved perspectives, scholars can produce a responsible 
body of scholarship about the wage that will better serve the needs of 
policymakers and low wage workers for more effective wage policies that have a 
genuine role for equity and efficiency. 
Surprisingly, policymakers can safely ignore public opinion on this issue, 
or at least hold it constant.  Waltman shows with decades of polling data that 
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about three fourths of the public consistently supports raising the minimum wage, 
including majorities in every demographic group measured.  The wage and wage 
increases have registered majority support since polling on the issue began in the 
1930s (Waltman 50).  This is particularly interesting because many scholars of 
agenda setting, including Baumgartner & Jones, identify changes in public 
opinion as central causes of changing policy outcomes (16).  Political support or 
opposition has been more varied and significant for wage policy outcomes at the 
elite level. 
What cannot be ignored is the role of citizenship in the history of the 
wage.  When advocates such as labor and New Dealers have found a larger 
political significance in the policy than just preventing starvation, the wage has 
taken on increased importance.  From the beginning, labor unions have believed 
that the wage can raise workers’ standard of living so that they can be full 
participants in their communities, full citizens.  This political implication of the 
wage has eroded over time, and today there are scant traces of it among 
progressive Democrats, even within the living wage movement.  If this country 
wants to achieve a national living wage, an expanded emphasis on the citizenship 
implications of the policy should be resurrected, however unlikely or unpopular 
that appears today. 
 Considering the facts and analysis of this paper, what should be the verdict 
on the wage?  Even in light of the possible mal effects and general ineffectiveness 
of the wage to have an influence on aggregate economic indicators, the legislated 
floor for hourly pay prevents employers from paying starvation wages with 
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impunity.  No one should forget that there are workplace environments in this 
country where the employer has considerable power over workers and their pay. 
Certainly some pockets of these workers are vulnerable to employer exploitation 
in the form of paying extremely low wages.  The Congressional Research Service 
reports that 479,000 workers were paid the minimum wage in 2005 (Mayer 7).  
Over half of workers paid less than $7.25 an hour had family incomes below 
$40,000 (12).  If the minimum wage prevents these working class people from 
being paid starvation level wages, even considering the rigidities imposed on 
business by the wage, then Americans are left with an economy that is humane 
and decent at some basic level.  This goal is worth the cost, at least in any polity 
that values community, economic citizenship, and responsible scholarship. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix Ia.  
Historical Levels of the Federal Minimum Wage. From the Department of Labor. 
FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE RATES UNDER THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT 
Minimum hourly wage of workers in jobs first covered by  
Effective Date  1938 Act 
1  1961 Amendments 
2  1966 and 
Subsequent 
Amendments3  
      Nonfarm   Farm 
Oct 24, 1938  $0.25       
Oct 24, 1939  $0.30       
Oct 24, 1945  $0.40        
Jan 25, 1950  $0.75        
Mar 1, 1956  $1.00        
Sep 3, 1961  $1.15   $1.00     
Sep 3, 1963  $1.25        
Sep 3, 1964    $1.15      
Sep 3, 1965    $1.25      
Feb 1, 1967   $1.40   $1.40  $1.00   $1.00 
Feb 1, 1968   $1.60  $1.60   $1.15  $1.15  
Feb 1, 1969      $1.30   $1.30 
Feb 1, 1970      $1.45    
Feb 1, 1971      $1.60    
May 1, 1974  $2.00   $2.00  $1.90   $1.60 
Jan. 1, 1975  $2.10  $2.10  $2.00  $1.80 
Jan 1, 1976  $2.30  $2.30   $2.20  $2.00  
Jan 1, 1977      $2.30   $2.20 
Jan 1, 1978  $2.65 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
Jan 1, 1979  $2.90 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
Jan 1, 1980  $3.10 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
Jan 1, 1981  $3.35 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
Apr 1, 19904  $3.80 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
Apr 1, 1991  $4.25 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
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Oct 1, 1996  $4.75 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
Sep 1, 19975  $5.15 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
Jul 24, 2007  $5.85 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
Jul 24, 2008  $6.55 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
Jul 24, 2009  $7.25 for all covered, nonexempt workers 
 
1 The 1938 Act was applicable generally to employees engaged in interstate 
commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. 
2 The 1961 Amendments extended coverage primarily to employees in large retail 
and service enterprises as well as to local transit, construction, and gasoline 
service station employees. 
3 The 1966 Amendments extended coverage to State and local government 
employees of hospitals, nursing homes, and schools, and to laundries, 
drycleaners, and large hotels, motels, restaurants, and farms. Subsequent 
amendments extended overage to the remaining Federal, State and local 
government employees who were not protected in 1966, to certain workers in 
retail and service trades previously exempted, and to certain domestic workers in 
private household employment. 
4 Grandfather clause - Employees who do not meet the tests for individual 
coverage, and whose employers were covered by the FLSA on March 31, 1990, 
and fail to meet the increased annual dollar volume (ADV) test for enterprise 
coverage, must continue to receive at least $3.35 an hour.  
5 A subminimum wage -- $4.25 an hour -- is established for employees under 20 
years of age during their first 90 consecutive calendar days of employment with 
an employer. 
<http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/chart.htm>. 
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Appendix Ib. 
Minimum Wage Laws in the States - January 1, 2008.   
From the Department of Labor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
<http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm>. 
 
American Samoa has special 
minimum wage rates
States with 
minimum wage 
rates the same as 
the Federal
States with 
minimum wage 
rates lower than 
the Federal
States with 
minimum wage 
rates higher than 
the Federal
States with no 
minimum wage 
law
 60 
Summary 
 
Where did the idea of a minimum wage come from?  Why did the federal 
minimum wage get enacted when it did?  Why did the wage decline in political 
importance as well as real monetary value, starting in the 1970s?  What is the 
likely future of the minimum wage?  These basic questions about one of the oldest 
and most symbolic federal labor market policies have not been adequately 
answered by scholars.  This paper weighs in on these questions, hoping to 
improve the debate surrounding them.  In the process, the importance of linking 
the wage to citizenship becomes clear.  As the political thought of the issue has 
moved away from conceiving of minimum wages as tools for reaffirming the 
status of low wage workers, support for the wage, and its monetary value, has 
declined.   
Exploring these central questions about the wage illustrates that the 
political thought about the policy has had fused political and economic 
implications from the time of the wage’s conception during the late nineteenth 
century.  At the end of the nineteenth century, labor unions wanted to ensure that 
hourly wage workers would be considered citizens just as much as independent 
yeoman farmers had been.  Minimum wages provided reassurance that the 
economic status of a wage worker was tied to the political status of full 
participation in American society.  To unionists, the wage was about more than 
just preventing starvation or economic efficiency.   
As the decades have passed since the wage’s inception, various groups 
have advocated in favor of minimum wages.  Not all of these groups have been 
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equally enthusiastic advocates.  This paper attempts to show that as advocates 
have eroded their linkage of the wage to citizenship, their support of the wage has 
weakened.  While President Roosevelt and his New Deal tied the minimum wage 
to full political status and achieved substantial progress on wage legislation, the 
issue waned in importance as liberals linked the wage only to subsistence.  
Among the present advocates, the lack of a revival of the larger political 
dimensions of the wage most likely signals that a substantially higher wage floor 
will not be passed. 
This paper also attempts to address the inadequate answers to the 
questions laid out above by defining a responsible approach to scholarship of the 
minimum wage.  This approach improves on the perspectives of not only many 
conservative scholars who take a narrow economic view of the policy, analyzing 
it only from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, but also many liberal 
academics who assume that the minimum wage is beneficial and ignores the 
potential drawbacks of the wage in their work.  These narrow approaches to the 
subject have prevented scholars from robustly evaluating the federal wage floor.  
In their analysis of minimum wages, economists need to look beyond 
disemployment effects, just as liberal scholars and community activists need to 
look beyond vague notions of justice.   
A wide variety of sources have been consulted in order to build the 
arguments in this paper.  Three kinds of books are cited most frequently: works 
that analyze the economics and politics of the minimum wage, histories of the 
relevant time periods, and primary sources that advocate for or against wage or 
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illustrate the political thought of an era.  Several journal articles in each of these 
categories have been helpful, as has the Department of Labor website.  Other 
miscellaneous sources include interviews with sources on Capitol Hill, newspaper 
articles, and court decisions.  Put together, this range of sources allows this paper 
to analyze the relationships between an array of intellectual, political, and 
economic factors that have shaped the minimum wage over the last 120 years.  
Besides the overarching claim about the erosion of the wage and its link to 
political status, this analysis has yielded the following conclusions, which are 
phrased as corrections to misperceptions in much of the existing literature. 
 First, chapter 1 explains that the minimum wage was conceived by 
organized labor, not by the Progressive Movement.  The progressives certainly 
played a vital role in advancing minimum wage legislation and intellectual 
justifications of the policy, but some scholars’ claims that progressives invented 
the wage floor concept are not borne out by fact.  Glickman framed labor’s belief 
this way:  “the living wage is a wage level that offers workers the ability to 
support families to maintain self respect and to have both the means and the 
leisure to participate in the civic life of the nation” (66).  Labor incubated this idea 
for the progressives, and indeed this connection to citizenship has given the wage 
an political importance that has declined over time as this link has eroded. 
Second, chapter 2 shows that the federal wage passed when it did only 
because of highly unusual factors, such as the Great Depression, the court packing 
attempt, and the innovations of New Deal political thought.  Passage of a national 
minimum wage was not part of an inevitable march toward higher living 
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standards and economic security in America.  In Congressional testimony in 
1937, John L. Lewis, President of the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) 
[an unskilled labor union federation], stated that the FLSA “‘will bring a greater 
measure of leisure and economic well-being’; and ‘the pending measure will offer 
to these unfortunate victims of our existing economic system and opportunity to 
rise to industrial citizenship’” (Nordlund 37).  This echoes earlier ideas of the 
labor movement, ideas that gave birth to a commitment to minimum wages before 
the Progressive Era.  While the wage was never a top priority of labor unions, 
their thinking about its contribution to citizenship and a consumer economy has 
remained largely consistent throughout the decades. 
Third, chapter 3 claims that the wage declined in real value starting in the 
1970s because of the combined effects of the halfhearted support of liberals, the 
decline of organized labor, the strengthening of conservatives in Congress and the 
presidency, and the emergent predominance of neoclassical economic thinking.  
While liberals viewed the “minimum wage as a cash transfer program, and not a 
very important one at that”  and Ronald Reagan stating that “‘The minimum wage 
has caused more misery and unemployment than anything since the Great 
Depression’” the wage was destined for a partial roll back (Waltman 23 and 
Nordlund 189). 
Finally, chapter 4 argues that the federal wage is not poised for comeback, 
despite the hopes of progressive activists of the contemporary living wage 
movement.  Even advocates of the wage such as Senator Obama, Senator Clinton, 
and activist-scholar Robert Pollin virtually ignore the citizenship justification of 
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the wage that was so powerfully wielded by the labor movement and New Dealers 
decades before.  Without this commitment to this political content of the wage, it 
is doubtful the current advocates of the wage will fair much better than in recent 
decades. 
Overall, this paper has taken sides on a number of questions about the 
history of the wage, finding that that the minimum wage was conceived by 
organized labor, not by the Progressive Movement.  The progressives certainly 
played a vital role in advancing legislation and intellectual justifications of the 
policy, but some scholars’ claims that progressives invented the wage floor 
concept miss the earlier contributions of organized labor, including the key 
linking of minimum wages to participation in civic life. During the 1930s, the 
economic context of declining wages became paramount, overwhelming most 
other concerns of policymakers about setting wage levels.  This economic context 
combined with the political dominance of Roosevelt’s New Deal to produce the 
right conditions for the passage of the federal minimum wage.  
In contrast, the decline of the wage in the 1980s was the product of a 
combination of political forces, including the strengthening of the conservatives 
in Congress, the decline of unions, the weak place for the wage in liberal political 
thought, and the renewed faith in neoclassical economic models (which was an 
intellectual development rather than a change in the state of the economy or an 
electoral event).  When this view of historical forces is applied to the present, 
there are no large shifts apparent in economic pre-conditions, political forces, 
ideology, or institutions that would propel major changes.  Unfortunately for low 
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wage workers in need, the outlook for the wage looks stable, albeit in a reduced 
state relative to the liberal heyday of the 1960s. 
What cannot be ignored is the role of citizenship in the history of the 
wage.  When advocates such as labor and New Dealers have found a larger 
political significance in the policy than just preventing starvation, the wage has 
taken on increased importance.  From the beginning, labor unions have believed 
that the wage can raise workers’ standard of living so that they can be full 
participants in their communities, full citizens.  This political implication of the 
wage has eroded over time, and today there are scant traces of it among 
progressive Democrats, even within the living wage movement.  If this country 
wants to achieve a national living wage, an expanded emphasis on the citizenship 
implications of the policy should be resurrected, however unlikely or unpopular 
that appears today. 
 Considering the facts and analysis of this paper, what should be the verdict 
on the wage?  Even in light of the possible mal effects and general ineffectiveness 
of the wage to have an influence on aggregate economic indicators, the legislated 
floor for hourly pay prevents employers from paying starvation wages with 
impunity.  No one should forget that there are workplace environments in this 
country where the employer has considerable power over workers and their pay. 
Certainly some pockets of these workers are vulnerable to employer exploitation 
in the form of paying extremely low wages.  The Congressional Research Service 
reports that 479,000 workers were paid the minimum wage in 2005 (Mayer 7).  
Over half of workers paid less than $7.25 an hour had family incomes below 
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$40,000 (12).  If the minimum wage prevents these working class people from 
being paid starvation level wages, even considering the rigidities imposed on 
business by the wage, then Americans are left with an economy that is humane 
and decent at some basic level.  This goal is worth the cost, at least in any polity 
that values community, economic citizenship, and responsible scholarship. 
